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Some Notes on the Proper Uses of the Clear and 
Present Danger Test 
James W. Torke* 
Since its formulation in 1919 in Schenck v. United States,' 
the clear and present danger test has drifted uncertainly through 
changing styles of free speech doctrine. Promulgated by a unani- 
mous C ~ u r t , ~  next used as a dissenters' banner,3 then employed 
by majorities4 and even an apparent, if occasional, con~ensus,~ 
sometime after its drastic reformulation in 1951 in Dennis u. 
United States6 it surely fell from whatever general grace it had 
enjoyed. Since that time, its use, a t  least its explicit use, has been 
confined to a few specific instances such as contempt cases in- 
volving free speech claims.' 
Later I will contend that the clear and present danger test 
has been more widely used, although in masked form, than has 
been admitted and that its value lies in more than its vivid form.8 
But for now I wish to suggest the extent of its rejection. Perhaps 
the most consistent and adamant attacks have come from Profes- 
sor Kalven who, in the wake of the New York Times libel case,g 
pronounced that the clear and present danger test had disap- 
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. B.S., 
1963, J.D., 1968, University of Wisconsin. 
1. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
2. Id. 
3. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined 
by Brandeis, J.). 
4. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
5. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
6. 341 U.S. 494, 507-10 (1951). 
7. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). The rise, fall, and current status 
of the test has been traced in the following works: M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 46-75 (1966); McKay, The Preference For Freedom, 
34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182,1207-12 (1959); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": 
From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Comment, Clear and 
Present Danger-Full Circle, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 385 (1974). 
8. Its vividness as a catchphrase does seem to account in part for the phenomenon 
observed by Professor Kalven that clear and present danger "is a legal test which has 
always had far greater status in nonlaw circles than in the legal world." H. KALVEN, THE 
NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 (1965). On the other hand, its status among nonlaw- 
yers may stem from its fundamental soundness. 
9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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peared, had, in fact, "been obliterated."1° Such a fate was praise- 
worthy in his view because clear and present danger seemed t o  
leave the status of seditious libel, the bane of free speech, in 
doubt." He chronicled his distaste for the test's "intellectual pov- 
erty" frequently.12 Others, coming from seemingly disparate 
directions, have expressed similar disapproval. For one, the test 
is oversimplified and fails to account for essential factors such as 
the value of the speech, its relative danger, less burdensome con- 
trols available, and the speaker's intent.13 For another the stan- 
dard proves an insufficient protection because it "permits the 
government to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being 
effective."14 Yet another commentator claims the doctrine is im- 
proper, not because it provides a "subjective and an inadequate 
safeguard against the regulation of speech, but rather because it 
erects a barrier to legislative rule where none should exist."15 
Justices of various doctrinal affinities have doubted the rule's 
value as well. Justice Frankfurter could never abide its use? 
Justice Brennan would confine it to contempt and subversive 
activities cases." Justices Black and Douglas, onetime propo- 
nents, l8 came to mistrust and ultimately to reject the test notably 
after the Dennis debacle.19 The bases for these many criticisms 
will be examined more closely later on, but whatever their force, 
they have not swept all before them and insofar as they bade 
farewell to clear and present danger, they were premature.20 
10. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213-14, 218. 
11. Id. at 206. 
12. H. KALVEN, supra note 8, a t  17. See also, e.g., Kalven, Professor Ernst Freund 
and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1973); Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, 
and Wide-Open9'-A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 289, 
297 (1968). 
13. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1949). 
14. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 16 (1970). 
15. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
33 (1971). 
16. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542-44 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(at best it is "a literary phrase"). 
17. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First 
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1965). 
18. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,284-85 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissent- 
ing); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,585 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Giboney 
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 
(1947); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
19. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449-50,454 (1969) (Black & Douglas, JJ., 
concurring); H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 52 (1968). 
20. See, e.g., Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: AneAppreciative Com- 
ment on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1965). 
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Despite these criticisms, there is reason to believe that if the 
clear and present danger formulation has almost vanished, its 
basic emphasis and points of focus have not. Sometimes it is only 
thinly masked, as Justice Douglas seems to have recognized in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio;21 less frequently, like an old idiom that 
won't be shed, it appears in explicit form. Thus, in City of Madi- 
son Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela- 
tions Commission, the Court seems to approve its use.12 Its most 
recent applications, however, can be as disturbing to proponents 
as to detractors. Thus, recently the Chief Justice turned back to 
Dennis "to determine whether . . . 'the gravity of the "evil," 
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' "23 The fact is that 
despite its notoriety, the test still has adherents, both on and off 
the 
Many have decried the lack of a unifying first amendment 
guide useful across a wide spectrum of free speech cases, and 
many have made useful contributions to correct that deficiency? 
I contend that the clear and present danger test, properly under- 
stood and applied, provides a sure measure of the acceptable 
limits of expression in the great number of first amendment is- 
sues-from commercial speech to seditious libel, and from the 
street corner to the national press. Before describing the proper 
operation of the rule, however, it is necessary to describe the 
values of the first amendment from which flow its proper bounds. 
The clear and present danger doctrine will then be examined for 
its usefulness in determining whether a given expression is in- 
cluded within those bounds. I will also suggest that the test, far 
from being dead or shelved, is still central to the Court's handling 
of many speech problems, an approach I regard as not only 
happy, but unavoidable. 
21. 395 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
22. 429 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1976). 
23. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U S .  539, 562 (1976) (quoting United States 
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). 
24. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 46-75; Fuchs, Further Steps Toward a 
General Theory of Freedom of Expression, 18 W M .  & MARY L. REV. 347 (1976); Shaman, 
Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test: Toward a 'Principled Interpretation of 
the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60 (1976); Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A 
Speech Test For All Seasons?, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (1975). 
25. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877 (1963); Kalven, supra note 10; Shaman, supra note 24. 
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A. The Trouble Wi th  History 
What is the function of the first amendment? Historical evi- 
dence has proven at  best merely suggestive. While searches into 
the past have revealed a plenitude of notions, platitudes, and 
practices, these point in such a variety of often-opposing direc- 
tions that one is forced to mine the materials selectively. Such 
extraction happens to yield much material heartening to 
twentieth-century proponents of a liberal view of free expression. 
Abundant evidence, however, also supports a more restrictive 
view. 
Many advocates of an expansive reading of the free speech 
clause, including Justice Murphy writing in Thornhill v. 
Alabama, have found comfort in the letter from the Continental 
Congress to the people of Quebec: 
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the 
press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement 
of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion 
of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its 
ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its con- 
sequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive 
officers are ashamed or intimidated into more honourable and 
just modes of conducting affairs.26 
This theme permeates a number of early state constitutional pro- 
vision~.~' Professor Chafee's pioneering study of free speech docu- 
ments several strains in eighteenth-century America which con- 
vinced him that the popular if not the legal concept of free speech 
recognized "the right of unrestricted discussion of public af- 
fair~."~* And if the minds of the Founding Fathers are to be as- 
sayed, a quote from Jefferson's first inaugural address is repre- 
sentative of a multitude of noble sentiments: "If there be any 
among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its 
republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of 
the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where 
reason is left free to combat it."2Wven the skeptical eye of Leon- 
26. 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (quoting 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 104, 
108 (1904 ed.)). 
27. See generally R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 29 
(19%). 
28. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1941). 
29. 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CML RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 7 (3d ed. 1967). 
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ard Levy finds eighteenth-century currents supportive of the 
broadest view of free speech," including Tunis Wortman's little- 
known but remarkable essay that presaged Alexander Meikle- 
john's insight that free and representative government depends, 
by its very nature, upon free discourse.31 In sum, there are many 
seeds and roots underlying the celebrated and energetic opinions 
of Holmes and Brandeks2 Even the "discovery" of Justice Bren- 
nan that the central meaning of the first amendment is to be 
found in its rejection of the concept of seditious libel (punishment 
of speech of the governed attacking the g ~ v e r n m e n t ) ~ ~  was no fiat. 
On the other hand, more repressive strains were clearly pres- 
ent, even prevalent, in eighteenth-century America. Professor 
Levy, whose notable investigations have already been mentioned, 
solemnly concludes that a preponderance of evidence suggests 
"that the generation which adopted the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights did not believe in a broad scope for freedom of expres- 
sion, particularly in the realm of p o l i t i ~ s . " ~ ~  In fact, as  late as 
1796, America was arguably in a state of "arrested development" 
in formulating a broad notion of free expres~ ion .~~  Others, if not 
so comprehensively, have documented this "legacy of supres- 
sion," and especially the vigor of seditious libel which takes stark 
shape in the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.36 For every "good" 
Jefferson extolling liberty and pardoning victims of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, there is a Jefferson pursuing hotly his enemies in 
the press.37 Nor is the nineteenth century a period of clear victory 
for the broad view of the first amendment. At the center of such 
legal sources as are available is Patterson v. color ad^,^^ firmly 
limiting the first amendment to a proscription of prior restraints 
and concluding that it does "not prevent the subsequent punish- 
ment of such [speech] as may be deemed contrary to the public 
 elfa are."^' So Justice Holmes' grudging acknowledgement that 
30. See L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (1966). 
31. Id. a t  229-84 (Document 29). See also St. George Tucker's rather libertarian view. 
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, app. note G (St. George Tucker ed. 1803). 
32. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, 
joined by Holmes, J.); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.). 
33. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964). 
34. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY xxi (Torch- 
book ed. 1963). 
35. L. LEVY, supra note 30, a t  Ixx. 
36. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 28; R. RUTLAND, supra note 27. 
37. L. LEVY, supra note 34, a t  297-307. 
38. 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
39. Id. a t  462. 
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"[ilt well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the 
freedom of speech is not confined to previous  restraint^"^^ repre- 
sents a turning from solid historical evidence (though arguably to 
other, equally solid historical evidence) that was weighty enough 
to sway many of his c~ntemporaries.~~ Thus, Professor Corwin 
concluded that  "the cause of freedom of speech and press is 
largely in the custody of legislative majorities and of juries, 
which, so far as there is evidence to show, is just where the fra- 
mers . . . intended it to be."42 
The fact is that, as many have concluded,43 history is not 
clear. History is crowded with people every bit as inconsistent as 
we. Perhaps, as Professor Chafee concludes, the Framers were 
vague about free speech because until the Alien and Sedition Acts 
no momentous need forced the sort of clarification for which law- 
yers search.44 Be that as it may, we are not compelled to reject 
the principles of Areopagitica because its author excluded Roman 
Catholics from freedom's blessings or because he accepted a posi- 
tion as government censor.45 So likewise, where we find a rich 
legacy of rhetoric and principles, we are not compelled to follow 
only the bleakest messages from our past.46 Rhetoric and princi- 
ples may bear later fruit and are valuable precisely as they 
prompt us to give them ~ubstance.~' Surely, one cannot deny the 
40. Schenck v. United States, 249 U S .  47, 51 (1919). 
41. See, e.g., Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist Period: 
The Sedition Act, 18 MICH. L. REV. 615 (1920); Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press 
Under the First Amendment: A R6sum6, 30 YALE L.J. 48 (1920); Long, The Freedom of 
the Press, 5 VA. L. REV. 225 (1918); Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2 MINN. 
L. REV. 239 (1918). 
42. Corwin, supra note 41, a t  55. 
43. See, e.g., R. RUTLAND, supra note 27; Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First 
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); Chafee, Book Review, 
62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949). 
44. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 28, a t  16. 
45. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 47 (Macmillan ed. 1952) (excludes from the open mar- 
ketplace of ideas, "Popery and open superstition, which as it extirpates all religions and 
civil supremacies, so itself should be extirpate"). See also Auerbach, The Communist 
Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U .  CHI. L. REV. 
173, 186-89 (1956); Bork, supra note 15, at 20-23. 
46. As Professor Fuchs has explained: 
If, for example, a previously unknown letter from Madison to Hamilton 
should be discovered expressing his contention that the first amendment would 
not cover fictional works but only explicitly political treatises, it would not 
affect the conclusion that the first amendment, in most cases, protects all liter- 
ary and political expression. 
Fuchs, supra note 24, a t  348 n.3. 
47. Among the arguments Madison advanced in favor of a bill of rights is his state- 
ment that "[tlhe political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the 
character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated 
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vigor of public debate, especially during the pre-Revolutionary 
period, and the existence of seeds of a free expression tradition. 
Equally certain is the notion that the people's agreement to gov- 
e m  themselves is fundamental to American political theory. It is 
from this starting point-self-government-that we fashion our 
theory of the function of free speech.48 
B. First Amendment Values 
For Alexander Meiklejohn, the Court's decision in New York 
Times Co. u.  was "an occasion for dancing in the 
streets."50 His joy, of course, stemmed from the Court's explicit 
recognition that the central meaning of the first amendment con- 
cerns the people's right to discuss freely their government. Sedi- 
tious libel, therefore, simply has no place in this country. Among 
Meiklejohn's contributions to first amendment thought is his 
exposition of the primacy of free speech among a self-governing 
people. Of course, Meiklejohn had  precursor^,^^ but he developed 
the proposition most lucidly: the people, as sovereign, agree to 
govern themselves through elected representatives; in order to 
maintain control over these representatives it is necessary to have 
a means more frequently available than periodic elections; and 
in order to govern well the people must have access to all informa- 
tion relevant to self-government. The means chosen is the reten- 
tion of the right to speak freely. The first amendment, then, is 
most like the tenth-it is a reservation of governing powers.52 Free 
speech, far from being a threat to sovereign security, is the critical 
protection of the people's sovereignty. Free speech as a restraint 
on government depends upon the "exclusion of governmental 
force from the process by which public opinion is formed on pub- 
lic issues."53 The force of this rationale has been widely accepted 
with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion." 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269, 273 (Hunt ed. 1904). 
48. Cf.  Bork, supra note 15, at 22 ("We are, then, forced to construct our own theory 
of the constitutional protection of speech."). 
49. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
50. Kalven, supra note 10, at 221 n.125. Professor Kalven shared the sentiment. Id. 
51. See, e.g., note 31 and accompanying text supra. 
52. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF- 
GOVERNMENT (1948); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245; Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 
(1953). 
53. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1449 n.105 
(1962). 
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by commentators who otherwise differ greatly." Before the New 
York Times case, and even before the publication of Meiklejohn's 
most influential expositions, the thesis was not unknown on the 
Court. Thus, Justice Murphy wrote in 1940 that "[tlhe safe- 
guarding of these [first amendment] rights to the ends that men 
may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that false- 
hoods may be exposed through the processes of education and 
discussion is essential to free g~vernment . "~~  And in 1937 Justice 
Cardozo characterized freedom of speech as "the matrix, the in- 
dispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."" 
These Justices were only extending themes marshalled by 
Holmes and Brandeis in opinions5' that are themselves derived 
from strong currents in American thought.58 Therefore Justice 
Brennan's description of the first amendment's "central mean- 
ing" is fully congruent with what went before. 
Of course, it may be (and in fact has been) contended that 
the Meiklejohn thesis requires, a fortiori, the conclusion that only 
speech bearing on government is entitled to full protection. Meik- 
lejohn himself occassionally hints in that direction when, for ex- 
ample, he comments that a ban on obscenity is no more an excep- 
tion to free speech than is a yellow cat an exception to the premise 
that "all dogs are black."" This would seem to lead to the prefer- 
ence for one type of expression-political-over others. 
Although not always consistently and surely not without ex- 
c e p t i o n ~ , ~  the Court has clearly extended first amendment pro- 
tection beyond the realm of purely political speech.61 We may 
properly ask upon what grounds it has done so. 
54. Compare Bork, supra note 15, a t  22-23 with Emerson, supra note 25 and Fuchs, 
supra note 24. 
55. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
56. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
57. See cases cited note 32 supra. 
58. See text accompanying notes 26-33 supra. 
59. Meiklejohn, supra note 52, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. at  473-74. 
60. The practice of preferring certain types of speech solely on the basis of content is 
well-ensconced in Supreme Court practice, the most notable example being the special 
treatment allotted to obscenity. See text accompanying notes 117-18 infra. In some ways 
a more disturbing illustration is afforded in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 
U.S. 50 (1976), where Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court observes that "there is surely 
a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline 
between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of 
social and political significance." Id. at 61. 
61. The willingness of the Court to extend the first amendment to literature, films, 
and other matters not directly political in nature is so well established as to require no 
citation. The Court has, of course, done so quite consciously. See, e.g., UMW Dist. 12 v. 
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) ("[Tlhe First Amendment does not 
protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political."); 
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1. Additional values 
The fullest exposition of additional values subserved by the 
first amendment was made by Professor Emerson. In his seminal 
article, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,62 he 
describes four functions to be served by free speech. First among 
these is individual self-fulfillment, that is, the enhancement of 
man as a reasoning creature whose dignity and individual devel- 
opment is an end in itself. Second, he views a system of free 
expression as crucial to the attainment of truth in all areas of 
human thought. Third, there is that value already discussed: a 
self-governing citizenry must have free access to gather as well as 
to exposit all information relevant to governance. Fourth, he con- 
tends that free expression promotes stability by allowing for or- 
derly change: when problems may be fully aired, the ultimately 
explosive neglect of grievances is avoided. Free expression, then, 
is a safety valve. These four values have been widely, though not 
universally, accepted. 
Professor Bork, applying "neutral principles," rejects the 
bulk of Emerson's argument and contends that an extension of 
first amendment protection beyond the realm of political speech 
is unwarranted.19 Of the four functions advanced by Emerson, 
Bork points out that the first two are not attributes unique to 
speech and hence provide no basis for its preferment over any 
number of other activities. The fourth, Bork argues, is peculiarly 
a legislative or executive concern and hence is left to the wisdom 
of those branches." This leaves only the third, political truth, as 
a Thus, insofar as Professor Bork's rejection of these addi- 
tional values seems telling, his critique should be responded to or 
deflected. 
2. A broader relevance 
Alexander Meiklejohn, while recognizing "that there are 
many forms of communication which, since they are not being 
- - 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) ("Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill 
its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is 
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their 
period."). 
62. Emerson, supra note 25; see also, T. EMERSON, supra note 14, at 3. 
63. Bork, supra note 15. 
64. Id. at 25. He seems less than clear as to why these matters of expediency could 
not have been a consideration during the "legislative" act of adopting the Bill of Rights. 
65. See Bork, supra note 15, at 30-31. See also BeVier, The First Amendment and 
Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
299 (1978). 
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used as activities of governing, are wholly outside the scope of the 
First Amendment,"" would include among the matters critical to 
governing well such items as education, science, philosophy, and 
arts: "I believe, as a teacher, that the people do need novels and 
dramas and paintings and poems, 'because they will be called 
upon to vote.' "" The point is that to govern well one requires all 
knowledge, that without creating additional or subsidiary values, 
the primary goal-an informed citizen-encompasses more than 
information directly concerned with politics. Therefore, only that 
speech which forms "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order and morality"68 may be proscribed. 
Thus, by broadening the notion of what is relevant to an informed 
citizen, the great amount of expression may be protected even 
after Professor Bork's winnowing of values. Political relevance 
has broad limits. 
3. Skepticism and neutrality 
I t  was Justice Stewart who knew hardcore pornography when 
he saw it," and it was Justice Brennan who labored so hard in 
Roth u. United States70 and A Book Named "John Cleland's 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" u. Attorney General7' to draw 
the crucial border of socially valuable expression. Yet, while there 
is no reason to doubt that Stewart still knows it when he sees it,72 
both he and Justice Brennan lately have come to agree "that we 
have been unable to provide sensitive tools to separate obscenity 
from other sexually oriented but constitutionally protected 
speech, so that efforts to suppress the former do not spill over into 
the suppression of the latter."73 They have sensed the difficulty 
66. Meiklejohn, supra note 52, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. at 258. 
67. Id. at 263 (quoting Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 16). 
68. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The reader will recog- 
nize that this notion of essentially valueless expression has been the critical element in 
the obscenity tests the Court has fashioned. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 
49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); A Book Named "John Cleland's Mem- 
oirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
69. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
70. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
71. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
72. Although the late proliferation of sexually explicit materials may have caused 
him a loss of certainty. 
73. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent- 
ing, joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ.). 
1 1 CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER 11 
of recognizing "valuable" speech and of fashioning a sufficiently 
sensitive and lucid guide that will not intimidate expression near 
the border of the valuable. They would thus pull back from mono- 
lithic regulation of obscenity to the narrow protection of juveniles 
and privacy-that is, to areas where a more tangible harm can 
be discerned. 
This type of fundamental skepticism has, of course, been 
associated frequently with Justice H ~ l m e s , ~ ~  and it is a theme 
that is central to the working out of his clear and present danger 
test. Thus, in Abrams v. United States, he states: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me per- 
fectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your 
power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally 
express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To 
allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the 
speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the 
circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or 
that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when 
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . . "75 
This type of skepticism shies away from categorizing speech on 
the basis of the value of its content. It anticipates knowledge 
rather than truth and, in fact, leads to the basic first amendment 
dictum that "above all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."" Or, as 
Professor Karst has recently stated, "the principle of equal liberty 
lies at  the heart of the first amendment's protections against 
government regulation of the content of speech."77 
74. For a review of the changing roles assigned Holmes in American thought, see, e.g., 
White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971). 
75. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also 
Meiklejohn, supra note 52, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. a t  263; Torke, Book Review, 62 KY. L.J. 
452, 465-66 (1974) (B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY). 
76. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also, e.g., Schacht v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940). This principle of content neutrality is also at the heart of 
licensing cases from Love11 v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), to Hynes v. Mayor of 
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976). 
77. Karst, Equality as a Central I3.inciple in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
20, 21 (1975). See also, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 583-90 (1974) (White, J., concur- 
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Insofar then as one accepts the idea that the first amendment 
is crucial to self-government, and that we should be wary about 
picking and choosing between expression on the basis of content 
or relative value, we may then inquire as to what legal guides are 
available for dealing with first amendment cases. 
C.  First Amendment Approaches 
If the first amendment serves to assure the existence of in- 
formed citizens capable of intelligently ordering their lives, then 
a means is needed whereby we can recognize, so as to protect, that 
speech which subserves first amendment values. Roughly speak- 
ing, we need a means of separating valuable speech (as defined 
by our goals) from speech without value. There are at  least three 
ways to approach this task: (1) we may make a distinction based 
upon the form of communication, that is, we may take the word 
"speech" literally as defining the acceptable medium of commu- 
nication, other mediums being subject to regulation under nor- 
mal due process and equal protection standards; (2) we may at- 
tempt to judge the communication by its content or meaning, 
without regard to its form but rather in light of its message; or 
(3) we may adjudge the communication according to its impact, 
that is, in light of whether it actually serves our goals or does 
The Supreme Court has, a t  one time or another, and some- 
times contemporaneously, resorted to each of these approaches. 
We will examine them more closely. 
1. The form of expression and the symbolic speech problem 
I t  would be possible, though I think not very helpful, to dis- 
tinguish between protected and unprotected expression on the 
basis of its form. That is to say, the first amendment term 
"speech" could be read literally to encompass only that expres- 
sion which takes a written or verbal form. This notion is not as 
implausible as it may a t  first seem. After all, as speech and writ- 
ing are common and effective means of communication, the most 
important human media are kept open, and at  the same time 
talking and writing normally provide communication with fewer 
ring); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing 
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HAW. L. REV. 1482, 1502-03 (1975). 
78. The recognition in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964, of the 
"central meaning" of the first amendment is not a test or tool at all, but simply a 
statement of goals and purposes, relevant, surely, to formulation of a test, but not a test 
itself. 
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incidental risks than other forms of cornmuni~at ion.~~ But, in 
fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized for many years 
that protected expression may take other forms.80 This recogni- 
tion, however, has never grown into a satisfactory exposition as 
to which forms of expression are protected and which are not. 
Both in the courts and the literature, the problem has often 
gone under the rubric of "symbolic speech." While recognizing 
that expression may take various forms, the Court has necessarily 
rejected "the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct 
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the con- 
duct intends thereby to express an idea?' The problem remains: 
which activities "can be labeled 'speech' "?82 Even after United 
States u. 0'Brien,83 some justices remain unconvinced that an 
adequate test has been formulated "for determining a t  what 
point conduct becomes so intertwined with expression that it 
becomes necessary to weigh the State's interest in proscribing 
conduct"84 against the interests in free speech. Others have ex- 
pressed similar dissat i~fact ion.~~ 
A helpful starting point would be the abandonment of the 
term "symbolic speech" as  well as the phrases it has spawned 
such as "pure speech,"86 speech in its most "pristine" form," or 
"speech plus." These terms are more than mere carryovers from 
a somewhat atavistic adoration of the word, and tend to divert 
one from a more helpful analysis. Properly speaking, the black 
armbands worn by the Tinker children were speech, not simple 
conduct "akin to pure speech." At the very least the armbands 
represented as much or more speech as if the Tinkers had quietly 
verbalized their opposition to government policy in Southeast 
Asia. As Professor Henkin has pointed out, "[a] constitutional 
distinction between speech and nonspeech has no content. A con- 
stitutional distinction between speech and conduct is specious. 
79. I t  might also be argued that  "the word," spoken and then written, being so 
singularly human and such a crucial human invention, is sacred. 
80. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
81. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
82. Infinite examples which almost no one would accept as protected speech could 
be posited; e.g., homicide to emphasize a message, etc. 
83. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
84. Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
85. See, e.g., Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First 
Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 30 (1973). 
86. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
87. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). See also Kalven, The Con- 
cept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (these distinctions 
provide no intelligible rationale). 
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Speech is conduct, and actions speak."88 Rather, "[tlhe mean- 
ingful constitutional distinction is not between speech and con- 
duct but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other 
kinds of conduct."8g So, in O'Brien's case i t  is fair (and helpful) 
to note that "[blurning a draft card to express one's opposition 
to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% 
express i~n."~~ How then shall we disentangle the regulable from 
the nonregulable? 
Various approaches have been suggested. Some would con- 
centrate on the intent of the actor to communicate (including a 
lack of intent to do otherwise) and the extent to which the act can 
be understood to be an act of cornmuni~ation.~~ This hardly seems 
a useful test. In addition to the problems inherent in ascertaining 
the actor's state of mind, we are a t  sea concerning which audience 
must interpret the act as communicative vel non. Suppose some- 
one burns a government flag inside a building-his predominant 
intent being to communicate. Whose characterization of the act 
is to serve as the standard? That of those receptive to and concur- 
ring in the message? That of those opposing the message? That 
of a disinterested passer-by? That of the flag's custodian? In any 
case, assuming all would agree that it was communicative, who 
would require the government to stand passively by to witness the 
destruction of property and to ignore any concurrent danger of 
fire? If intent and interpretation are the sole-guides, there are no 
limits. On the other hand, if custom supplies the "objective" 
measure of the communicatiye aspect, that is, if communication 
is limited to its customary forms, we draw the line too strictly and 
discourage creative and vivid cornmuni~ation.~~ 
The solution proffered by the Court in O'Brien is to subject 
the claimed government interference with first amendment activ- 
ity to the following four-part test: Is the government action (a) 
within the constitutional grants of power, (b) in furtherance of an 
important government interest, (c) unrelated to the suppression 
of free speech, and (d) formulated in a way least restrictive of the 
communicative elements present?g3 This test, or a t  least its appli- 
cation in O'Brien, has been subjected to considerable analysis, 
88. 
89. 
that all 
90. 
91. 
L. REV. 
92. 
93. 
Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968). 
Id. at 79-80. See also Kalven, supra note 87, at 23 ("To begin with, I would suggest 
speech is 'speech plus' " in that, for example, it  contains an element of noise). 
Ely, supra note 77, at 1496. 
See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 88, at 79-82; Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. 
1091, 1103, 1109 (1968). 
See generally Ely, supra note 77, at 1489 n.29. 
391 U.S. at 377. 
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much of it  unfa~orable .~~ Thus it has been contended that since 
nonpossession of draft cards was itself prohibited, the significant 
variable in the challenged antimutilation provision under which 
O'Brien was convicted was the public nature of his act, the only 
significance of which could have been the activity's communica- 
tive element. Under this analysis, the government's case trips on 
the third part of the test. Whether or not this criticism is compel- 
ling, it does focus on a delicate aspect of the O'Brien test. 
Professor Nimmer refines the third element of the O'Brien 
test by distilling the concept of the "overnarrow statute." An 
overnarrow statute is a statute that prohibits ostensibly regula- 
ble, nonspeech conduct, but in contexts that, upon close analysis, 
are distinguishable only by their communicative potential from 
contexts not r e g ~ l a t e d . ~ ~  Such analysis isolates the critical varia- 
ble, and if it is the communicative element of the conduct which 
leads to regulation, the presumption, if not the conclusion, should 
arise that the government is acting in an unconstitutional man- 
ner. 
This leads to perhaps the most trenchant of the O'Brien 
commentaries, that of Professor Ely? He too acknowledges the 
crucial nature of what has been characterized as the third part 
of the O'Brien test, and concludes: 
The critical question would therefore seem to be whether the 
harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of 
the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more partic- 
ularly out of the way people can be expected to react to his 
message, or rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct 
had no communicative significance ~ha t eve r .~ '  
Thus, the critical point in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School D i s t r i ~ t , ~ ~  for example, "is that the dangers 
on which the state relied were dangers that flowed entirely from 
the communicative contentflg9 of the armbands, for surely the 
- - 
94. See, e.g., Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning 
Case, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091 (1968). 
95. Nimmer, supra note 85, at 39-42. Professor Nimmer concedes that "if the State 
can pose a non-speech interest as the basis for suppressing conduct," then, regardless of 
the actor's intent, even predominant intent, to communicate, the "conduct should not be 
regarded as protectible under the first amendment." Id. a t  39. 
96. Ely, supra note 77. 
97. Id. at 1497. 
98. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
99. Ely, supra note 77, at 1498. A similar conclusion applies to Cohen v. California, 
403 U S .  15 (1971), for as Professor Ely points out: "Had [Cohen's] audience been unable 
to read English, there would have been no occasion for the regulation." Ely, supra note 
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wearing of colored armbands is not itself objectionable. 
Application of this analysis to flag desecration casesloO leads 
to the realization that the governmental interest in such legisla- 
tion is ordinarily aimed a t  the communicative aspect of the de- 
fendant's conduct,lOl for no other interest-safety or property-is 
involved. This is fairly clear from the very face of the flag statutes 
which list only acts hostile to the flag. Yet the analysis is not 
complete. A conclusion that the government is attempting to 
regulate the communicative element simply switches one onto a 
new track, for it is clear that the first amendment, at least in the 
Court's hands, countenances some regulation of the message or 
communicative element of activity.lo2 We must therefore inquire 
under what circumstances the government can prevent or punish 
communication without violating the first amendment. There are 
two major approaches to be considered. For now, however, we 
have seen the O'Brien test properly operated as a starting point 
for speech problems. Even time, place, and manner regulations 
may effectively be put to the O'Brien test. If the critical third 
element is answered negatively, that is, if the crucial variable is 
not the communicative aspect, then one proceeds to the least- 
restrictive-alternative analysis, a type of balancing that even Jus- 
tice Black countenanced.lo3 If, however, the government regula- 
tion is directed a t  the communicative element of the activity in 
question, one must seek for further guidance and tests. Of course, 
some would stop right at  this point-an extreme absolutism. But 
even aside from the fact that the Supreme Court has never 
adopted the absolutist position, there are valid reasons, entirely 
consonant with the values of the first amendment, to proceed 
77, at  1498. But, had O'Brien used his draft card to start a campfire, the government's 
interest would remain the same. 
100. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 
(1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
101. Thus, Justice Fortas' dissenting bewilderment, Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 
576,615-17 (1969), as to why, if the state can prevent the burning of one's home or trousers, 
can't it prevent flag burning is easily answered: such antiburning laws promote safety or 
protect property of others. Only by designating the flag as a special exception to  the first 
amendment can flag desecration statutes be properly upheld. Chief Justice Warren 
seemed willing to take this straightforward track. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 604- 
05 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
102. Subjecting the flag statutes to further analysis ought, I think, to lead to their 
invalidation. By their very terms, desecration statutes, as that involved in Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), are not content neutral. Even improper use statutes, like that 
in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), while plausibly considered neutral, reveal 
no governmental interests other than protecting a symbol whose sole impact is intellectual 
or emotional and thus communicative. See also, Ely, supra note 77, a t  1502-03. 
103. H. BLACK, supra note 19, a t  61. 
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further. A single example will illustrate the point: Can the Con- 
gress forbid incitement to mutiny aboard a naval vessel engaged 
in action?lo4 If so, we admit some room for regulations of the 
message. 
Thus, the O'Brien formulation provides a helpful prefocus for 
cases in which there is a question whether a statute under attack 
is aimed a t  the communicative aspect of the charged behavior. If 
legislation is not so directed, the test fully answers our needs. If 
it is so directed, we must discover whether the first amendment 
nevertheless countenances regulation of the communication in- 
volved. Discussion of the two major approaches to this second 
task, a task that goes to the heart of the first amendment, follows. 
2. Expression without value and the categorization technique 
As suggested earlier, one approach to the free speech problem 
is to identify certain categories of speech as being without value 
and thus outside first amendment strictures.lo5 The Court has 
traditionally followed this approach in several areas. 
Much of the precedential impetus for this approach stems 
from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, lo6 in which Justice Murphy 
proclaimed: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in- 
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utter- 
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.lo7 
While it is difficult to find much legal precedent to support Jus- 
tice Murphy's words, it is likely that he was expressing a fairly 
common understanding. The emphasized portion of the above 
quotation seems essential to an understanding of the categoriza- 
104. Bork, supra note 15, at 21. 
105. Thus Professor Bork would limit full protection to political speech. Id. This is a 
narrow acceptance of the Meiklejohn thesis; although, as we have seen, even Meiklejohn 
was willing to regard certain categories of speech as outside the protection of the first 
amendment. See sources cited note 52 supra. 
106. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
107. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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tion approach;lo8 the emphasis is ostensibly upon the words them- 
selves, their context being consulted, if a t  all, only to enhance our 
understanding of the message being transmitted. Of course the 
particular category at  issue in Chaplinsky was that of fighting 
words, a category of "bad" speech that has lately taken on more 
complex ways. Thus, while the Court has claimed to have re- 
mained true to Chaplinsky, log the frustration of various dissenters 
in what are ostensibly "fighting words" cases is understanda- 
ble."O As Justice Powell has noted, the fighting words issue has 
come to depend less upon the objective character of the words 
than upon their context."' Insofar as the context of the utterance 
is emphasized, a shift is signalled toward concern with conse- 
quences in particular rather than in general.l12 
In the same year Chaplinsky was decided, Justice Murphy 
and his brethren were erecting another category of speech with 
little first amendment value. In Valentine v. Chrestensen113 the 
Court set aside speech of a commercial nature as being undeserv- 
ing of first amendment protection. Of course, the Court has been 
rebuilding in this area recently, and commercial speech appears 
about to be admitted to full first amendment status."4 Although 
clear lines have not yet been drawn, i t  may be of some signifi- 
cance that the Court's willingness to allow regulation of commer- 
cial speech seems to depend a t  times on an assessment of conse- 
quence~,"~ and at  times on an assessment of the character of such 
108. See also Shaman, supra note 24. 
109. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972). 
110. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 136 (1974) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 902, 903, 909 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Black- 
mun, J., dissenting). 
111. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
This is especially true after Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
112. Others also decry this shift. See, e.g., Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You 
Call Me That "-Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 KY.  L.J. 1 (1975). Professor 
Shea bemoans the upshot of this change insofar as it permits a sickly old man to  be 
insulted with impunity while a bellicose young hoodlum can not be. (Who ever said life 
was fair?) 
Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), shifted all the 
way to a "consequences approach." See text accompanying notes 137-44 infra. 
113. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
114. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of 
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see 
Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080. 
115. For example, in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Court leaves room 
for regulation of lawyers' advertising where more tangible untoward effects can be shown. 
Id. a t  366. Compare the distinction drawn between Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 
491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974) (where prohibition of "For Sale" signs was upheld) and the 
situation in Linmark Assocs., 1nc.v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 n.9 (1977). 
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speech, albeit a more refined one than Valentine promulgated.l16 
Possibly the most notable free speech pariah is obscenity. 
From its first official exile in Roth117 through the most recent 
 formulation^,^^^ obscenity has remained for a majority of the 
Court the archetype of speech without value, that is, speech 
banned not because i t  is probably dangerous but because i t  is 
worthless. 
The Chaplinsky dictum also listed "the libelous" as being 
outside the first amendment's protective zone. Ten years there- 
after that  categorization was confirmed in Beauharnais v. 
Illinois11g when a five-Justice majority upheld an Illinois group 
libel statute. Of course, things have changed significantly since 
Beauharnais with the discovery in New York Times of the tension 
between the concept of libel and the first amendment's central 
meaning. More recently, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,120 the 
Court retained the requirement of fault, but what was implicit in 
New York Times was made explicit in Gertz: civil recovery de- 
pends upon a showing of actual harm, i.e., untoward conse- 
quences. 
A final example of the categorization technique may, I think, 
fairly be said to have its roots in Learned Hand's famous opinion 
in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten. 121 AS the opinion came even 
before Schenck, Judge Hand had much leeway in fashioning a 
test for subversive advocacy. His product, that "[ilf one stops 
short of urging upon others that i t  is their duty or their interest 
116. The case of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 
413 U.S. 376 (1973), which so far has not been overruled, allowed the banning of sex- 
designated want ads where sex discrimination in hiring or the aiding of such discrimina- 
tion was a crime. The want ads are thus arguably incitements. Likewise, in Bates v. State 
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Court 
appears fully willing to permit regulation of false or misleading advertising apparently 
without regard to evidence of actual harmful reliance. 
The plurality opinion in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), 
seems to permit distinctions to be made between commercial and noncommercial speech, 
a t  least in the appropriate forum. Id. a t  301-04. 
Incidentally, the admission of commercial speech to first amendment membership 
has some disturbing aspects. If indeed it is to be a full-fledged peer, are we to conclude 
that the type of regulation the Court has suggested it will countenance-e.g., a firm 
insistence on truth-is available now to restrict other types of speech? If not, is commer- 
cial speech really only a commoner? 
117. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
118. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973). 
119. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
120. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
121. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
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to resist the law, it seems . . . one should not be held to have 
attempted to cause its violation,"122 has won much praise.lZ3 
While Judge Hand was dealing with a statute's proper construc- 
tion, his approach has been urged and adopted as a constitutional 
standard. The direct progeny of Masses are two cases following 
Dennis,124 to wit, Scales v. United States125 and Yates v. United 
States. 126 The key to government regulation isolated in Yates and 
Scales is the character or form of the speech-it must be advocacy 
to concrete action. Once shown to be such, the proximity of dan- 
ger is unimportant, the legislative determination that such advo- 
cacy is a danger being sufficient. This approach is not dead.12' 
According to Justice Harlan in Yates, "[tlhe essential distinction 
is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged 
to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to 
believe in something."128 The approach is related to the bad tend- 
ency formula set forth in Gitlow v. New York, 129 though the pre- 
cise form the advocacy must take has been tightened a notch or 
two. 
Professor Kalven's jubilation over the New York Times 
case130 rests in part on what he perceived as a rejection of the 
"two-tier" test in cases such as B e a ~ h a r n a i s l ~ ~  and Roth. 132 He 
further opines that the Times opinion provides "the true prag- 
matic test of freedom of speech,"133 although it is difficult to see 
this case as providing a test as much as stating a value or a credo. 
Yet in other contexts he has joined the praise of the Masses ap- 
p r 0 a ~ h . l ~ ~  I t  is not immediately apparent, however, that the ap- 
proach born in Masses leads naturally to, or is grown on the same 
fertile earth as, the New York Times case. 
122. Id. a t  540. 
123. See, e.g., Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975). 
124. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
125. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
126. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
127. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,448 (1974) (citing Bran- 
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which in turn cites Dennis, Scales, and Yates!). 
. 128. 354 U.S. a t  324-25. 
129. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
130. See note 50 and accompanying text supra. 
131. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
132. 354 U S .  476 (1957). See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 10; Kalven, The Metaphysics 
of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
133. The "test" Kalven extrapolates is the "absence of seditious libel a s  a crime." 
H. KALVEN, supra note 8, a t  16. See also Kalven, supra note 10, a t  204-05. 
134. See Karst, supra note 20, a t  9 (drawing from H. KALVEN, supra note 8, a t  16- 
17). 
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The trouble, it seems to me, with the categorization tech- 
nique, whether in its blatant obscenity form or under its more 
sensitive advocacy approach, is that it violates the principle of 
neutrality by presuming to know what information is and is not 
of value, a task not vouchsafed to the government. The problem 
is tha t  there is no tangible, verifiable demarcation between 
speech of value and regulable expression; there is no check be- 
yond the Justices' good conscience. Regulation is countenanced 
without requiring any showing of evil consequences. The context 
of the expression is considered only to adjudge its character.'35 On 
the other hand, the virtue of categorization is that insofar as the 
forbidden speech can be reduced to a precise formula,136 as is 
somewhat true where advocacy is concerned but  hardly true 
about obscenity, a person may better tailor his conduct to avoid 
punishment. May that virtue of certainty be retained but the 
defects shed? 
3. Assessment of consequences in light of first amendment 
values 
I have argued that fulfillment of first amendment goals can- 
not depend on the mode of communication-that is, that the 
speech-conduct dichotomy is helpful only when we realize that 
the distinction depends not upon the form of expression but 
rather on the discernment of the communicative aspect as being 
separate from its noncommunicative aspect. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be general agreement that in certain circumstances the 
communicative aspect may itself be the subject of regulation. A 
categorization technique discriminates between banned and pro- 
tected communication on the basis of the perceived value of the 
message. Yet so far as we realize "that time has upset many 
fighting faiths"13' and that in fact such a realization is a t  the very 
center of the tentative and skeptical motif of the first amend- 
ment, it seems undeniable that to make protection turn on con- 
tent is to violate the principle of neutrality so crucial to free 
expression-the government simply cannot prefer one message to 
another. Nevertheless, one can multiply examples of communica- 
tion which, if permitted, would be a surrender to dangerous chaos 
in which no freedom could be considered secure. But are not the 
seeds of the appropriate distinction contained in our very worry? 
135. See Ely, supra note 77, at 1493 n.44. 
136. See Gunther, supra note 123, a t  725. 
137. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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That is, when those dangers which we fear are about to come to 
pass, there we may appropriately draw a line. However, in order 
to preserve as wide-open a debate as possible we should be wary 
about cutting off or punishing the delivery of a message; we 
should want to do so only as a last resort and only when we are 
relatively certain that the evil effect of the message predomi- 
nates. To the extent that our prediction of evil effects depends 
less on guesswork or foresight, that we forebear as long as safety 
permits, and that we demand particularity rather than generality 
of danger, we have maintained the most open debate. But as 
these problems are frequently settled in a court, we need a prag- 
matic test. 
Basic to the American political ideal is the notion that mat- 
ters be arranged on the basis of informed decisions rather than 
force. The first amendment, it is generally agreed, is the guaran- 
tor that such decisions shall be as informed as possible. When, 
however, a given communication threatens to end debate, to have 
the "effect of force"13* rather than the effect of adding to our 
reservoir of information, then it no longer subserves first amend- 
ment values but in fact wars against them. Alexander Meiklejohn 
has underlined a significant but generally overlooked word in the 
first amendment: the people have a right "peaceably to assem- 
ble."139 Surely the Framers of the first amendment were sensitive 
to the tyranny of force in the form of a mob as well as in the form 
of despotic rule. When, therefore, messages have all the "effect 
of force" they may be prevented or punished. 
But how are we to determine when a given message has the 
"effect of force" rather than an intellectual impact? We can ex- 
amine the message itself and generalize about its untoward tend- 
ency, in fact create irrebuttable presumptions of evil conse- 
quences140 as the Court does when it categorizes according to 
content; or we can seek proof that a given message is having or is 
about to have untoward consequences by examing the message's 
context, that is, by seeking a particularized showing of causation 
rather than relying on what is in fact a presumption of evil. Surely 
the latter course promises, if greater risk, greater freedom; it also 
138. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("the deliberative forces should prevail 
over the arbitrary."); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) 
(describing expression with "a force not inhering in the words themselves"). 
139. Meiklejohn, supra note 52, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. at 259-60. 
140. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(he would allow such generalized fears to stand as rebuttable presumptions, subject to a 
demand for actual particularized proof of danger). 
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places a heavier burden on the government to justify suppression. 
The search for consequences-the demand for more than an 
"undifferentiated fear"141-generally accompanies an expanding 
view of the first amendment, whereas the definitional approach 
accompanies a restricting view. Thus, the refinement by Holmes 
and Brandeis of the clear and present danger test, surely a liberal- 
izing step, is marked by a growing demand for proof of actual 
consequences, a requirement notably abandoned by the Court in 
Dennis, Yates, and S ~ a 1 e s . l ~ ~  So, too, the changing approach to 
"fighting words" is marked by an  increasing rejection of prohibi- 
tions based upon an "undifferentiated fear" in favor of a demand 
for more concrete proof of danger. In fact, as  will be argued below, 
the liberalizing trend of this and the last decade was partly the 
result of an increased demand for proof of untoward conse- 
q u e n c e ~ . ' ~ ~  
* Still, concern with consequences does not alone assure an 
open system of expression, though it does serve to focus on certain 
data. Such a focus alone, without a constant mindfulness of val- 
ues and a useful test, fails to assure us that any number of conse- 
quences-offended sensibilities, unpleasant thoughts, and 
fears-will not become the bases for drawing the line of preven- 
tion. It is the clear and present danger test which, if properly 
applied, provides a standard which best balances144 the values of 
free expression against the danger of disorder. 
A. Proper Formulation of the Test 
I .  A clear, imminent, and serious danger 
The clear and present danger test was first formulated in 
Schenck v. United States145 and refined in several subsequent 
cases, the last and most crucial of which was Whitney v. 
C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~ V h e  telling charge against the defendants in 
141. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971). 
142. See text accompanying notes 124-27 supra. 
143. See text accompanying notes 206-13 infra. 
144. It is true that the clear and present danger test is a form of "balancing." I am 
hard put to imagine any approach that isn't. Yet the fulcrum of the test sits at that point 
which the values of free speech demand-between information and force. Moreover, the 
balance is foreordained, not constructed ad hoc according to the currents of individual 
cases. 
145. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
146. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). In my consideration of these cases, I am more interested in 
mining Holmes than in defending him. And while, as I hope is already clear, I regard the 
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Schench was that they conspired to cause insubordination in the 
armed forces and to obstruct recruitment and enlistment during 
a war by the distribution of a leaflet attacking conscription. 
Holmes was convinced that the leaflet and its distribution satis- 
fied the proof of intent demanded by the statute. Then, in re- 
sponse to defendant's first amendment defense, he uttered his 
now famous proposition: 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect 
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. 
It does not even protect a man from an injunction against utter- 
ing words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. 
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439. The question in 
every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances 
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent. I t  is a question of proximity and degree.14' 
Several points need to be made.148 First, the man-in-the- 
theatre metaphor has become almost as famous as the clear and 
present danger test itself, and has been variously quoted, belit- 
tled, and questioned.14) But it seems that its greatest significance 
is revealed by the question: What if the man shouts in good faith, 
but there are insufficient exits?150 The key distinction between the 
two cases is in the falsity of Holmes' character's shout-not be- 
cause all that is false is without protection, but rather because the 
falsity reveals bad intent, a factor the importance of which cannot 
be over10oked.l~~ Second, the phrase "effect of force" has been 
emphasized because it seems to describe the type of communica- 
tion that has no place in a system of free expression. It reveals 
1 
Holmes-Brandeis contribution to be preferable to the approach posed by Judge f a n d  in 
the Masses case, I have nothing directly to contribute to the interesting debate over the 
relative sensitivities of Holmes and Hand. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 123; White, supra 
note 74; Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1973). 
There are, in fact, gaps in the test's development which require filling; and there are 
putative applications of the test that I find difficult to justify. I do not, however, agree 
with Judge Hand's reference to Holmes that, in the creation and development of the test, 
"for once Homer nodded." L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 59 (1958). On the contrary, 
Holmes was progressively awakening. 
147. 249 U.S. a t  52 (emphasis added). 
148. For my view of the clear and present danger test, I am greatly indebted to M. 
SHAPIRO, supra note 7, a t  48-138. 
149. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human RRlations, 413 
U.S. 376, 398 (1973) (Douglas, J. ,  dissenting); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U S .  444,456-57 
(1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949); Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252, 296 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
150. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 28, a t  15. 
151. See text accompanying notes 158-60 infra. 
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the primary function of the clear and present danger test in dis- 
tinguishing between that speech whose impact is intellectual and 
thus supportive of first amendment values, and that  speech 
which has the effect of force,152 leaving no room for, and in fact 
derailing, the democratic process. Hence speech with the effect 
of force is not free speech a t  all, but a "verbal act." Third, the 
emphasis upon the particular circumstances is critical; one might 
think obviously so, but the later history of the test reveals that 
certain Justices were apt to ignore or reduce the importance of 
measuring the speech as and when it occurred: that is, recogniz- 
ing the test as a test of sufficiency of evidence. 
In Whitney, Justice Brandeis clarified the role of clear and 
present danger in relation to legislative attempts to prohibit sub- 
versive advocacy. Clear and present danger, he reasoned, is a 
limit on the reach of all legislative attempts to punish speech. 
That being the case, "the enactment of the statute cannot alone 
establish the facts which are essential to its validity."'53 This is 
so because the very nature of the legislative process is general, 
whereas an assessment of clarity and imminence of danger always 
betokens a changing temporal vantage. Thus, the legislature may 
in general apprehend that a certain type of speech is dangerous, 
but such apprehension "does not preclude enquiry into the ques- 
tion whether, at the time and under the circumstances, the condi- 
tions existed which are essential to validity under the Federal 
Con~t i tu t ion . "~~~  
Two other aspects of Justice Brandeis' concurrence need 
mention. As a preface to his explication of the three elements of 
clear and present danger, he states: 
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable 
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is prac- 
ticed. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the 
- 
152. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (such words 
have a "force not inhering in the words themselves . . . under such circumstances they 
become what have been called 'verbal acts'."). 
153. 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
154. Id. at  378 (emphasis added). Justice Brandeis does not make clear his view of 
the procedural role of the clear and present danger test. At one point he suggests that "the 
legislative declaration . . . creates merely a rebuttable presumption" that a clear and 
present danger existed. Id. at  379. On the other hand, he suggests that in Whitney there 
was sufficient evidence upon which the "court or jury" might have found that the danger 
existed. Whatever his views, the overbreadth holding in Brandenburg implies that the 
clear and present danger limit is part of the prosecution's case. Any rebuttable presump- 
tion of clear and present danger could operate only as a tacit ingredient of all legislation 
aimed at  speech. 
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danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable 
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.'55 
These three elements of the danger-its clarity, imminence, and 
seriousness-are all independent, each requiring some degree of 
proof without regard to the quantum marshalled for each of the 
other elements. This is the major flaw in the Hand formulation 
adopted by the Court in Dennis v. United States.156 The Hand 
version makes the elements interdependent. This formulation, at 
least in national security cases where the evil is great, reads clar- 
ity and imminence of danger virtually out of the test, leading to 
results such as Dennis which ignore the particular circumstances, 
consideration of which is crucial to the validity of the test. 
In Whitney we are also given a useful guide to the imminence 
element, a guide which incidentally ties the test to our primary 
first amendment values and illustrates the test's function of dis- 
tinguishing between speech fulfilling first amendment goals and 
speech having the effect of force: 
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and 
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so immi- 
nent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full dis- 
cussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the false- 
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of educa- 
tion, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence. Only an emergency can justify repre~si0n.l~~ 
2. The actor's intent 
Finally, to the basic shorthand phrase which describes the 
character of the communicative act, we must add a mental ele- 
ment. As was seen in the discussion of the man-in-the-theatre 
metaphor,158 a bad intent was an essential part of the original 
Holmesian position. 
Professor Shapiro has forcefully argued that the source of 
clear and present danger is criminal attempt law.159 Consultation 
of Holmes' writings on attempt reveal that for him an attempt lay 
only in the coming together of intent and acts breeding 
"dangerous proximity to success."160 Thus analyzed, clear and 
155. 274 U.S. a t  376. 
156. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
157. 274 U.S. a t  377. 
158. See text accompanying notes 147-51 supra. 
159. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, a t  55. See also P. FREUND, supra note 13, a t  25-26. 
160. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,387-88 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see 
also Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915); Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 
59 N.E. 55 (1901); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 65, 68 (1881). 
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present danger requires both imminence of danger and intent. 
B. The Early Development and Later Demise of Clear and 
Present Danger 
The above formulation of the clear and present danger test 
is obviously the result of some selective mining and gap-filling of 
the Holmes and Brandeis position. I t  also ignores some putative 
applications of the test which I find difficult to justify. But having 
in mind what I consider to be the proper formulation of the test, 
it is easier to see how clear and present danger has been used, 
misused, and surreptitiously used by the Court since its initial 
articulation in Schenck. 
Between the argument and the opinion in Schenck, the Court 
heard presentation of Frohwerk v. United Stateslsl and Debs v. 
United States, l s2  both involving charges under the Espionage Act. 
The two decisions remain perplexing in light of Holmes' state- 
ment in Schenck and his later explication of clear and present 
danger. Suffice i t  to say that  Holmes, writing for the Court, 
seemed satisfied that intent was sufficient to overcome the defen- 
dants' first amendment pleas when coupled with an assessment 
of the words' "natural tendency and reasonably probable ef- 
fect"ls3 in a situation "where a little breath would be enough to 
kindle a flame."164 
Such maladroitness is in sharp contrast to Holmes' dissent, 
the very next term, in A brams v. United States. ls5 The defendants 
were charged under those provisions of the amended Espionage 
Act which specifically forbade seditious speech. Here Holmes, 
with Brandeis by his side, began to unwrap the clear and present 
danger test, though not without injecting some contradictions 
which even the later contributions in Gitlowls6 and Whitney16' did 
not fully resolve. While he concludes that opinions cannot be 
suppressed "unless they so imminently threaten immediate inter- 
ference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country"ls8 (basically a 
formulation congruent with the Schenk statement), in a t  least 
three places he suggests that either imminent danger or "an in- 
249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
Id. at 216. 
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. at 209. 
250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
250 U.S. at 630. 
28 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
tent to bring it about"16g may suffice to justify suppression. Of 
course, if intent alone would suffice, we would have something 
approaching the Masses test or the type of test that some com- 
mentators have discovered in Brandenburg u. Ohio. 170 Yet certain 
other aspects of the Abrams and Gitlow dissents suggest the pro- 
per role of intent. For instance in Abrams, having stated that 
proof of publication for the very purpose of obstruction might 
suffice, Holmes continues that  the defendants' conduct then 
"would have the quality of an attempt."171 Similarly in Gitlow, 
Holmes writes that "[ilf the publication of this document had 
been laid as an attempt to induce an uprising against government 
a t  once and not a t  some indefinite time in the future it would 
have presented a different question."172 In such circumstances the 
law might act, subject, however, "to the doubt whether there was 
any danger that the publication could produce any result, or in 
other words, whether it was not futile and too remote from pos- 
sible consequences. " 173 
In the Gitlow case the majority rejected the relevance of clear 
and present danger where, as was the case with the New York 
criminal anarchy law under consideration, the legislature had 
already determined that advocacy of violent overthrow was so 
inimical to public welfare that proof of such advocacy, without 
more, was a basis for criminal punishment. Holmes, joined by 
Brandeis, dissented on the ground that "there was no present 
danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by 
Following its careful delineation in the Whitney concurrence,175 
however, the clear and present danger test enjoyed increasing 
acceptance on the Court.176 
I t  is, of course, in Dennis1" that the clear and present danger 
169. Id. a t  627-28. This same disjunctive appears in Justice Brandeis' concurrence in 
Whitney, 274 U.S. a t  376. 
170. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See text accompanying notes 186-88 infra. 
171. 250 U.S. a t  628. 
172. 268 U.S. a t  673. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. This dissent alone ought to put to rest any contention that Dennis, Yates, or 
Scales found the true meaning of clear and present danger, for these cases are clearly 
consistent with the Masses and Gitlow majorities. 
175. See text accompanying notes 153-57 supra. 
176. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 , 4  (1949); Giboney v. Empire Stor- 
age & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947); 
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 334, 347 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 
263 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 83, 104-05 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256, 258 (1937). See generally 
sources cited note 7 supra. 
177. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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test took an unexpected and dreadful turn. Chief Justice Vinson, 
unwilling to hold that "before the Government may act, it must 
wait until the putsch is about to be executed,"178 ignored the 
development we have traced and adopted Judge Hand's revision: 
" 'In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 
"evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of 
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' "179 Of course, 
once so formulated, it is not a clear and present danger test a t  
all, but a straightforward balancing test. Justice Frankfurter 
would have Congress do such balancing which would leave only 
the minimal constitutional standard of reasonableness to be 
applied by the courts.lM The natural legacy of Dennis surfaces 
in Yateslsl and Scaleslg2 which apotheosize the Masses formula: 
concentration upon the message in a void. Thereafter, explicit 
use of clear and present danger is rare;lm the test is applied, if a t  
all, as the minority view,lg4 or is spurned as too unprotective a 
shield. 185 
C.  The Present Status of Clear and Present Danger 
As noted at the outset, the common wisdom has it that clear 
and present danger, if not dead, is only invoked in the rarest of 
cases. Surely this is true if only explicit invocations are consid- 
ered. However, there is a basis for the proposition that, in part 
because of its inherent congruency with first amendment values, 
the Court has been using the test, or something very much like 
it, in a wide variety of cases. 
The most notable instance was in Brandenburg v. 0hio.lB6 
Under the test formulated there a state may not "forbid or pro- 
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent law- 
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action."lg7 
- 
178. Id. at 509. 
179. Id. at  510 (quoting the lower court's opinion, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
180. Id. at  524-27 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
181. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
182. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
183. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 
184. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 196-203 (1961) (Harlan, J., concur- 
ring); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,62-64 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Beauhar- 
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
185. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concur- 
ring). 
186. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
187. Id. at  447 (emphasis added). Others have noted the same thing. See, e.g., Sha- 
man, supra note 24; Fuchs, supra note 24; Comment, Clear and Present Danger-Full 
Circle, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 385 (1974); Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test  For 
All Seasons?, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (1975). Gunther finds in Brandenburg a synthesis of 
the best elements of clear and present danger and the Masses incitement test. Gunther, 
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Clearly the above test has two elements-intent and proximity of 
danger. As such, the Court's citation to, inter alia, Dennis and 
Yates is either ingenuous or careless, as is the later occasional 
grouping of Brandenburg with the Communist cases.lm Bran- 
denburg simply has little to do with Dennis, Yates, or Scales. 
In addition to this masked but relatkely intact appearance 
in Brandenburg, other specific and approving references to clear 
and present danger can occasionally be found.lsg And, after get- 
ting beneath the words of certain opinions not commonly consid- 
ered clear and present danger cases, the standard can also be 
discovered. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, lgO the Court described its concern as centering on 
whether "the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this 
case was entirely divorced fiom actually or potentially disruptive 
conduct."1g1 Looking a t  the record, the Court found "no evidence 
whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent"lg2 with 
school activities; moreover, "the record [did] not demonstrate 
any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast substantial disruption . . . or material interference."lg3 
A mere "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is 
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression,"lg4 but 
a "showing that the students' activities would materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school"195 will 
do. This same attention to circumstances in assaying the immi- 
nence of the danger was crucial to validation of the ordinance in 
Grayned u. City of Rockford, lg6 for there the Court was confident 
the Illinois Supreme Court would construe the ordinance, aimed 
at  interference with school activity, "to prohibit only actual or 
supra note 123, a t  754. I am willing to concur in that conclusion although I think the 
danger test alone has, or ought to have, the intent element without any boost from Masses. 
188. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 448 (1974); Healy v. 
James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972). 
189. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
562-63 (1976); Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697,698 (1974); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 
375 (1962). 
190. 393 US.  503 (1969). 
191. Id. a t  505 (emphasis added). 
192. Id. a t  508. 
193. Id. a t  514 (emphasis added). 
194. Id. a t  508. 
195. Id. a t  513. 
196. 408 US.  104 (1972). 
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imminent interferencew1" with schools' peace and good order. 
And in Police Department u. Mosley, l" Justice Marshall rejected 
generalizations that nonlabor picketing is most apt to produce 
violence, with the observation that "predictions about imminent 
disruption from picketing involve judgments appropriately made 
on an individualized basis. "IB9 
In fact, whenever the Court is asked to deal with the public 
forum, an assessment of the imminence of actual danger comes 
to the fore. The reversal of a disorderly conduct conviction stem- 
ming from an antiwar rally was premised on the conclusion that 
"there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of 
the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely 
to produce, imminent disorder."200 Even the cases of Edwards u. 
South Carolina201 and Cox v. Louisiana,202 a t  least the former of 
which has been regarded as a distinct avoidance of the clear and 
present danger test,203 reveal a concern with the imminence of 
violence or disorder, a concern serving as a basis for a t  least 
alternative holdings. I t  was on the assessment of the peril that 
Justice Clark split from his brethren in Edwards,204 and in Cox 
the Court was unimpressed with the "showing that violence was 
about to 
Of special note is the case of Cohen v. Calif~rnia,~" wherein 
the Court reversed a young man's disturbing-the-peace convic- 
tion for wearing a jacket bearing a vulgar epithet aimed at  the 
draft. Justice Harlan, noting tha t  a mere "undifferentiated 
fearW2O7 of harm is not sufficient to warrant suppression of com- 
munication, searched the record without discovering evidence 
that there was any intentional provocation or intent to arouse.208 
The record also failed to show that anyone had actually been 
violently aroused,20u or that a substantial group stood ready to 
assault C~hen.~lO The first two gaps in the record go to intent, the 
Id. at 111-12. The Court also noted an intent element. Id. at 113-14. 
408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
Id. at 100-01. 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
See Karst, supra note 20, at 8. 
372 U.S. at 244. 
379 U.S. at 550. 
403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
Id. at 23 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
U.S. at 508). 
208. Id. at 20. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 23. 
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latter two to proximity of danger. This, I think, is but the tip of 
a trend toward emphasizing consequences over categorization. Jt 
is this concern with the specific context that is modifying the 
fighting words doctrine from a definitional to a consequence- 
sensitive test, a shift which has been noted by the dissenting 
justices.211 The recent shift in commercial speech doctrine212 and 
the requirement of actual harm in libel cases213 are other manifes- 
tations of the same trend. 
Thus, without invoking the test and even a t  times while pur- 
portedly rejecting it, a number of apparently disparate cases turn 
on an  assessment of intent and imminence of danger-the very 
ingredients of the properly formulated clear and present danger 
test. 
D. Common Criticisms of the Test 
The attacks upon the clear and present danger test have been 
numerous and have come from many directions. Surely, however, 
the test in its mature form cannot be blamed, as it often is, for 
the results in cases such as Debs214 and Frohwerk215 where, even 
if formally applied, its application was mostly perfunctory, 
hardly operating as more than a literary phrase. Then too, it was 
not application but  rather abandonment of clear and present 
danger which wrought the Dennis216 decision.217 In fact, the test 
211. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U S .  130, 136 (1974) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 902-05 (1972) (Burger, C.J., & Powell, 
J., dissenting); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1972)(Burger, C.J., dissenting); 
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609-10 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). See also, Shea, 
supra note 112. 
In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U S .  713 (1971), a t  least three justices 
were influenced by the government's failure to show more than a "surmise or conjecture 
that untoward consequences may result." Id. a t  725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also 
id. a t  730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. a t  731 (White, J., concurring). 
212. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra. 
213. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Arguably this aspect of Gertz 
coupled with its demand for fault (taken from the New York Times case) fit nicely into 
clear and present danger analysis by requiring both consequences and a mental element. 
In the area of obscenity the Court remains wedded to a categorization scheme, leaving 
consequences for legislators to consider, although the dissenting trio-Stewart, Marshall, 
and Brennan-would shift somewhat toward a demand for more tangibly defined conse- 
quences. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting, joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ.). Early in the development of obscenity 
doctrine there was some consideration given to a consequences-centered approach. See, 
e.g., United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); T. 
EMERSON, supra note 14 a t  493; Kalven, supra note 132, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. a t  3. See 
suggestions for the future in Shaman, supra note 24, at 75. 
214. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
215. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U S .  204 (1919). 
216. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
217. See Gunther, supra note 123, a t  751. 
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as formulated to that time was pointedly rejected because Chief 
Justice Vinson fretted it would restrain the government until the 
''putsch" was executed.218 In his view, clear and present danger 
was too protective of speech. I t  was, in fact, the overly protective 
value of clear and present danger which led to its rejection or 
metamorphosis in cases like Dennis and B e a ~ h a r n a i s . ~ ~ ~ u c h  a 
result presents us with a certain irony: the test is rejected as 
inadequate because too protective.220 At least until Beauharnais, 
Justice Douglas was still willing to accept the general use of the 
test.221 After it became clear that Dennis had reformed the test 
beyond all protective value, however, Justices Black and Douglas 
repudiated it as insufficiently protective of speech. This repudia- 
tion has much currency; but it is largely directed to the Dennis 
formulation.222 Thus, a great number of attacks are either upon a 
severely diluted form of the test, a form I do not defend, or they 
call for rejection of the test as being too protective of speech. 
(This last contention seems to reject the value of the first amend- 
ment; but, of course, one is free to choose sides.) 
There are, however, more trenchant criticisms deserving di- 
rect response. Some contend that the test requires the trier of fact 
to engage in speculations which cannot help but lead to random 
results.223 Others have argued with equal force that the test 
"permits the government to cut off speech as soon as it comes 
close to being effecti~e."~' Finally, perhaps the most troublesome 
problem is the "heckler's veto": that is, insofar as the test 
"involves calculations as to the boiling point of a particular per- 
son or a particular group [i.e., the audience], not an appraisal 
of the nature of the comments per se,'y225 the speaker may become 
"criminal simply because his neighbors have no self-control and 
218. 341 U.S. at 509. 
219. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
220. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 14, at 493-94 (suggesting its inadequacy as a 
test in obscenity cases-again, as being overprotective!); H. KALVEN, supra note 8, at 44- 
45 (he too feels the test inadequate to the problem of group libel because it is too 
"simplistic" and incapable of dealing with the slower and corrosive evils of group libel; 
i.e., the test is too protective of speech). 
221. 343 U.S. at 285 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
222. A formulation apparently rejected by one and all, but no-see Chief Justice 
Burger's opinion for the Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976). 
223. According to Professor Gunther, it was this defect which led Learned Hand to 
his Masses approach. Gunther, supra note 123, at 725. 
224. T. EMERSON, supra note 14, at 16; Emerson, supra note 25, at 910-11. 
225. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966). See also, e.g., Shea, supra note 
112. 
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cannot refrain from violence. "226 
The clear and present danger test, properly formulated, ade- 
quately withstands those criticisms. The charge that the test re- 
quires speculation by the trier of fact is met by the requirement 
that the three elements of danger-clarity, imminence, and seri- 
ousness-must each remain independent and must each be satis- 
fied with sufficient proof. Thus the central safeguard, the demand 
for imminence, may not be stretched to include the distant future 
merely because the  danger appears serious.227 Undoubtedly a 
speculative element still remains; but short of allowing the dan- 
ger to come to pass, a danger ultimately threatening the system 
itself, we are, as in so many areas of law, left with our own lack 
of omniscience. The closer we come to the future to be forecast, 
however, the less room there remains for error. The categorization 
technique, it should be remembered, simply generalizes about all 
of the future. While it is true that some speculation, at  least by 
the court or the speaker, can be avoided by resort to a definitional 
approach, the costs of such an approach are too great. Categoriza- 
tion, especially when not guided by a standard such as clear and 
present danger, involves value choices by the government, a pick- 
ing and choosing of which speech is good and which is bad on the 
basis of content without any but the most speculative appraisal 
of harm. It is in fact this apprqach that allows the broadest li- 
cense for conjecture, and the licensee is the legislature-that 
body, as the opening words of the first amendment suggest, most 
to be feared. 
To the proposition that the clear and present danger test cuts 
off speech just when it becomes most effective, the only answer 
is clarification. When speech becomes, or threatens to become, 
most effective in breeding force, violence, or arbitrary action, it 
is no longer p r o t e ~ t e d . ~ ~  In fact, that clear and present danger as 
so far defined resembles Professor Emerson's expression-action 
dichotomy is undoubted; it operates to demark the same bound- 
ary, but surely it is more precise a transit than the mere names 
of the territories we wish to separate. 
Finally, it is the element of intent that rescues the speaker 
from the hostile audience, the heckler, the ill-behaved neighbor. 
Where the message calls for violence and where violence appears 
about to come to  pass, or where the audience's hostility has 
reached a boiling point that cannot be controlled and is clear for 
- - 
226. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 28, at 151, quoted in Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U S .  at 200. 
227. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U S .  494, 507-10 (1951). 
228. See generally Fuchs, supra note 24. 
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all to see, the speech can no longer subserve first amendment 
values. To proceed in the face of the uncontrollable audience 
gives sufficient evidence of intent.229 In most situations, the intent 
can be discerned from the message and the context. 
In identifying the limits of governmental power in free speech 
questions, we first recognize that the first amendment is the very 
matrix of a democracy as its functions to retain the means 
whereby the citizen can control by comment his representatives, 
and can make, through gaining information, the most enlight- 
ened decisions possible. Thus, while "political speech" is theoret- 
ically a t  the core of the first amendment, and is clearly within its 
protection, the value of a broadly educated electorate and the 
importance of the principle of neutrality prevent us from limiting 
that protection to purely political speech. But a t  the same time, 
we see that certain expression destroys or threatens to destroy the 
operation of the open forum, that is, the very "system of freedom 
of expression." The clear and present danger test is the standard 
by which we can separate expression adding to our information 
and thus subserving the values of the first amendment from 
speech having the effect of force and thus destroying the values 
of the first amendment. Insofar as the test has a temporal compo- 
nent, i t  must be administered in light of the particular circum- 
stances obtaining a t  the moment. Therefore, the test becomes one 
of sufficiency of evidence for the courtU0 and not for the legisla- 
ture, except as a guide to the general allowable reach of legisla- 
tion. Moreover, in order to preserve the widest possible room for 
expression, that is, communication in whatever form, the three 
elements of danger-clarity, imminence, and seriousness-must 
remain independent, each requiring a given degree of proof. Only 
that evil which is so imminent as to come to fruition before it can 
be absorbed and considered in open debate can be prohibited. 
The additional element of intent prevents the speaker's first 
amendment protection from depending on the reaction of those 
who hear him. Thus formulated, the clear and present danger test 
229. See the interesting proposal for hostile audience confrontation in Note, Hostile- 
Audience Confrontations: Police Conduct and First Amendment Rights, 75 MICH. L. REV. 
180 (1976), which would permit police interference only after a clear and present danger 
of violence which cannot be controlled is found to exist and is explained to the speaker, 
who then continues in the face thereof. 
230. Cf. Wechsler, Symposium on Civil Liberties, 9 AM. L. SCH. REV. 880 (1941) 
(arguing for a balancing approach). 
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withstands the critics' attacks. 
It remains only to set the clear and present danger test in its 
operational perspective. I t  is apparent that it is a test of wide 
appl i~abi l i ty .~~ If properly tuned, it is part of a calculus well- 
fitted to serve the values of free speech in the great number of 
speech cases. It is first necessary to apply the 0'Brienn2 test, or 
something very much like it, to determine if the governmental 
interest is directed at the communicative element of the activity 
being adjudged. If it is not, then some type of least-restrictive- 
alternative or balancing approach is appropriate to resolve the 
conflict of governmental and individual interests in the case. If, 
however, the regulation is directed at  the message, the court 
should examine the challenged governmental conduct to see if it 
violates the neutrality demands of the first amendment. If not, 
the court must next determine whether the speech sought to be 
regulated constitutes a clear and present danger of a serious sub- 
stantive evil, care being taken to apply the test in the manner and 
with the ingredients described above. So applied, the test would 
not have landed Dennis and his comrades in prison, nor would it 
prohibit flag desecration, but isn't that the risk the first amend- 
ment commits us to take? 
A brief illustration may be helpful. Let us consider a statute 
prohibiting outdoor burning without a permit as applied to the 
burning of a stack of books kindled in front of a public library. 
According to the defendant, the fire was set to protest the exist- 
ence of pornographic books on the library's shelves. A first 
amendment defense is thus raised. The court should seek to dis- 
cover what valid governmental interests are furthered by the stat- 
ute, for example, avoidance of danger from fire and smoke pollu- 
tion. So long as the statute is tailored precisely to protect against 
dangers which do not arise from reception of the message aspects 
of the conduct, the legislature has demonstrated no interest in 
abridgement of communication per se, and the defense is unavail- 
ing. If, however, the statute specifically forbids the burning of 
flags, the statute appears overnarrow, i.e., a legislative concern 
with speech is isolable: neither danger nor pollution is the aim of 
the statute, but the offensiveness of burning the national symbol. 
231. I make no claim, however, that it would be useful in cases dealing with corollary 
first amendment rights such as freedom of association or beliefs; yet even in such cases 
the fundamental division it marks should inform the particular lines and limits to be 
drawn. 
232. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See text accompanying notes 93- 
104 supra. 
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At this point a true speech issue is focused and questions of neu- 
trality arise. Suppose further, however, that the statute had been 
narrowly construed to apply only when such burning threatens a 
breach of peace. Then, the clear and present danger test becomes 
appropriate. 
Although most have given up the test for dead, its principal 
elements-a determination of the speaker's intent and an assess- 
ment of the proximity of the danger-continue to be extensively 
used by the Court in a variety of free speech contexts. The Court's 
apparent unwillingness to use the clear and present danger label 
may stem from a wise sensitivity: it may be impossible to disasso- 
ciate the slogan from the misuse and distortions of the past. If 
that be the case, the Brandenburg formulation is available and 
should be used.233 
233. Cf. BeVier, supra note 65, a t  340-43 (arriving a t  a somewhat similar conclusion 
though by a different route). 
